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Highlights 
 We systematically review everyday cognitive failures in healthy samples. 
 Subjective failures are not consistently related to objective cognitive outcomes.  
 Failures are shaped by a range of trait- and state-like factors.  
 Failures reflect fluctuations in cognitive capacity rather than pure ability. 
 Failures tell us about ‘real life’ cognition, distinct to performance in the lab. 
 
Abstract 
Cognitive failures are minor errors in thinking reported by clinical and non-
clinical individuals during everyday life. It is not yet clear how subjectively-reported 
cognitive failures relate to objective neuropsychological ability. We aimed to 
consolidate the definition of cognitive failures, outline evidence for the relationship 
with objective cognition, and develop a unified model of factors that increase cognitive 
failures. We conducted a systematic review of cognitive failures, identifying 45 articles 
according to the PRISMA statement. Failures were defined as reflecting proneness to 
errors in ‘real world’ planned thought and action. Vulnerability to failures was not 
consistently associated with objective cognitive performance. A range of stable and 
variable factors were linked to increased risk of cognitive failures. We conclude that 
cognitive failures measure real world cognitive capacity rather than pure 
‘unchallenged’ ability. Momentary state may interact with predisposing trait factors to 
increase the likelihood of failures occurring. Inclusion of self-reported cognitive 
failures in objective cognitive research will increase the translational relevance of 
ability into more ecologically valid aspects of real world functioning.  
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1. Introduction 
Apparently healthy people experience the frustration (and sometimes embarrassment) 
of ‘brain farts’ or cognitive failures on a daily basis. Common incidents include walking to a 
room only to forget what you were looking for, locking your keys in the car, or repeatedly 
pushing an apparently jammed door before noticing the large ‘Pull’ sign emblazoned on its 
front. Whilst irritating and generally quite minor, some individuals tend to experience these 
slips more often than others. For these people, cognitive failures can represent a serious concern 
and barrier to successfully carrying out routine responsibilities. Currently, the factors that 
increase proneness to cognitive failures are not well understood, and comparisons with 
objective cognitive domains have done little to assist researchers in determining how such 
errors might be prevented.    
The ageing population is bringing to the fore our limited understanding of cognitive 
failures. Even healthy ageing appears to be associated with decline in specific types of 
cognitive functions, such as those involving the demand for recall (Hohman, Beason-Held, 
Lamar, & Resnick, 2011; Rast, Zimprich, Van Boxtel, & Jolles, 2009). However, increased 
awareness of dementia means middle-aged and older people are experiencing more anxiety 
about normal cognitive decline, a phenomenon known as ‘dementia worry’ (Kessler, Bowen, 
Baer, Froelich, & Wahl, 2012). They are increasingly turning to commercial brain training 
programs to improve function. The marketplace for these cognitive training tools is projected 
to be worth US$5,721.2 million by 2018 (Markets and Markets, 2014). Whilst training in a 
specific task may improve performance on that task, it is unclear whether improvement 
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generalises to real life cognitive functioning (Kelly, Loughrey, Lawlor, & Robertson, 2014; 
Valenzuela & Sachdev, 2009). Available tools target specific aspects of cognitive ability, but 
do not address everyday problems. Understanding the nature and triggers of cognitive failures, 
as well as their relationship to formal cognitive assessment, would help improve identification 
of individuals at risk for normal age-related cognitive decline, dementia, and some 
psychological disorders, at different points in the lifespan, prior to substantial reductions in 
cognition and functioning being realised.   
The term ‘cognitive failures’ was coined by Broadbent et al. (1982) to refer to minor 
slips that cause the normally smooth flow of intended action (physical or mental) to be 
disrupted. Cognitive failures reflect a global liability towards frequent lapses in cognitive 
control. Several measures have been developed to assess the degree of liability one possesses 
to express cognitive failures; those identified in this review are listed in Table 1. The most 
widely used of these is the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ; Broadbent et al., 1982), 
which is also the broadest measure in terms of domains of error assessed. Rather than focusing 
exclusively on the CFQ, we have decided to include all of the cognitive failures measures in 
the current review. Whilst other measures may focus on particular types of errors, they each 
tap into the subjective experience of cognitive failures, which is worthy of consideration here.  
A number of concerns have been raised with regards to the validity of subjective 
measures of cognitive functioning. Some authors suggest self-reports of cognition must match 
up with performance on objective (laboratory-based) tasks in order to be considered valid (e.g. 
Herrmann, 1982). Therefore, the current lack of a neat marriage between the CFQ and objective 
outcomes is a concern for many cognitive researchers. This is linked to other more general 
concerns about self-reports of cognition, such as the high demand placed on respondents’ 
memory by requiring recall of specific experiences over a relatively long time period (Myin-
Germeys, Delespaul, & Van Os, 2003).  
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Reservations about subjective experiences of cognition also reflect the traditional 
approach of cognitive psychology, which focuses solely on objectively assessed ‘trait’ intellect 
(see Horn, 1972). This is known to be predicted by several relatively stable factors;  most 
notably genetics (Davies et al., 2011). Changes in performance occur only in response to 
biological processes such as ageing, injury, and disease, and produce specific, well-
documented cognitive profiles (e.g. González-Blanch et al., 2007; Hildebrandt, Fink, Kastrup, 
Haupts, & Eling, 2013). Thus, the stability and predictability of trait cognitive ability makes it 
appealing to clinicians and researchers alike. However, most people feel instinctively that their 
cognitive functioning varies with their mood, environment, and particularly over time - some 
days they simply do not function as efficiently as usual, whilst at other times they are far more 
focused.  The objective cognitive tasks, considered the gold standard in both research and 
clinical settings, whilst useful, capture cognition in an idealistic environment, and at only one 
point in time. On the other hand, reports of cognitive failures could add to our understanding 
of how cognitive processes play out in real life,  improving ecological validity of research into 
human cognition. 
 
1.1 Review objectives 
Despite the potential for a better understanding of cognition in real-life contexts, 
subjectively-reported cognitive slips and failures comprise a small research area. The aim of 
this review is to identify and draw together the various different factors involved in day-to-day 
patterns of failures in healthy individuals. Three core questions will be: 
1) How do we define the construct of cognitive failures? 
2) What is the relationship between subjectively-reported cognitive failures and 
performance on objective tasks?  
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3) What biological, psychological and environmental factors influence levels of cognitive 
failures?  
As yet, no review of the cognitive failures literature exists. Thus, the current systematic 
review is necessary to facilitate the development of a unified model of factors that influence 
liability towards cognitive failures in otherwise healthy individuals. This is timely given that 
this area of study has evolved significantly over the past three decades.  
 
2. Method 
We designed and reported this systematic review based on the principles of the 
PRISMA statement (Liberati et al., 2009).  
 
2.1 Search strategy 
Studies were identified by searching electronic databases and scanning reference lists. 
PsycINFO (1967-June 2015), Web of Science’s Social Sciences Citation Index (1956-June 
2015), Scopus (1960- June 2015) and the Cochrane database were searched using the following 
index items via Boolean search criteria: “cognitive slip* OR cognitive failure* OR subjective 
cogniti* AND everyday;” “cognitive slip* OR cognitive failure* OR subjective cogniti* AND 
daily.” These search terms were derived from examination of seminal cognitive failure articles. 
No limits were applied for year of publication or language, but only English-translated papers 
were accessed.  Reference lists of key articles were hand-searched. All types of papers were 
included in the search. The last search was run on 10th June, 2015. 
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2.2 Eligibility criteria 
Inclusion and exclusion criteria were outlined prior to the search. Studies were included 
if they were: 
 Published in a refereed journal;  
 Identified cognitive failures or subjectively-reported cognitive impairment as one of 
their primary measures or outcomes; and  
 Utilised a quantitative, subjective measure of everyday cognitive functioning.  
Studies were excluded if they: 
 Sampled from a non-healthy/clinical population (e.g. dementia, disease, psychological 
disorders);  
 Were attempts to validate measures with specific populations (e.g. cultural, language 
groups) or created for specific populations (e.g. hospitalised elderly people);  
 Measured subjectively-reported cognitive performance with too few items (i.e. < 5 
items if quantitative);  
 Came from non-psychological or health-related research fields (e.g. ergonomics); or 
 Studied an intervention (e.g. cognitive remediation, CBT for sleep problems). 
Case studies, letters to the editor, and conference abstracts were also excluded.  
The researchers screened titles and abstracts of the articles gathered during the search against 
the exclusion criteria. Selected articles were then read and excluded if they focused on any 
excluded topic or did not use acceptable subjective measures of cognitive failure (Figure 1). 
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3. Results 
We included 45 articles in the review. The studies varied widely in their research design 
and grouping of participants. Most of the studies used correlational designs (n = 38), and the 
remainder consisted of experimental (n = 4), longitudinal (n = 2), and population designs (n = 
1).   
3.1 Study characteristics 
 3.1.1 Location 
 A large portion of the studies were led by researchers based in the United States (n = 
16). This was followed by the United Kingdom (n = 9), the Netherlands (n = 4), Canada (n = 
4), Germany (n = 3), Ireland (n = 2), Italy (n = 2), the Czech Republic (n = 1), Denmark (n = 
1), Iceland (n = 1), Japan (n = 1), and Switzerland (n = 1). 
 
 3.1.2 Study populations 
 All the articles in this review drew samples from non-clinical populations, including: 
 Student populations. 
 Organisation personnel, including hospitals and the military. 
 Community groups. 
 
3.1.3 Measures of cognitive failures 
 Four different structured self-report measures of cognitive failures were identified in 
this review. A brief overview of each of these is provided in Table 1. In addition to these, 
several authors chose to construct their own brief self-report measures of cognitive failures. 
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This included six articles in which the authors utilised experience sampling methodology to 
capture cognitive failures in the flow of everyday life by requiring participants to report them 
either as they were experienced, or at regular intervals throughout the day (Jónsdóttir, 
Adólfsdóttir, Cortez, Gunnarsdóttir, & Gústafsdóttir, 2007; Kane et al., 2007; Lange & Süß, 
2014; McVay, Kane, & Kwapil, 2009; Unsworth, Brewer, & Spillers, 2012; Unsworth, 2015). 
The studies are arranged in tables according to the area they explored or compared. 
Some articles contained overlaps of topics; these were grouped according to their primary 
focus.   
 
3.2 What are the key features of the construct of cognitive failures? 
3.2.1 Dimensions of cognitive failures 
Several studies examined the construct of cognitive failures (n = 9; Table 2). Cognitive 
failures were broadly defined as one’s tendency to experience errors and slips in functioning 
(Boomsma, 1998; Broadbent et al., 1982; Wallace, Kass, & Stanny, 2002). The original 
Broadbent et al. (1982) paper treated cognitive failures as reflecting a trait usefully 
dichotomised into ‘high’ and ‘low’ groups. However, some authors highlighted that alongside 
this general component, the measure contains more specific factors (Unsworth et al., 2012). To 
this end, three studies examined the underlying structure of the CFQ via factor analysis. The 
models produced ranged inclusion of three (Broadbent et al., 1982), four (Wallace et al., 2002) 
and five factors (Pollina, Greene, Tunick, & Puckett, 1992). All articles highlighted memory 
and action slips as core dimensions measured by the CFQ, whilst perception, distractibility, 
and interpersonal intelligence were less consistently identified.  
 CFQ scores were found to be distributed normally throughout the healthy population, 
although women tend to report more failures than men (Boomsma, 1998; Kanai, Dong, 
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Bahrami, & Rees, 2011).  A large-scale genetic study of Dutch families suggested that 50% of 
variability in scores is due to familial heritability (Boomsma, 1998). The authors of the study 
found no evidence for effects of shared environment; it was suggested that non-genetic variance 
in CFQ scores is shaped by external factors specific to the individual rather than the family 
unit. 
Exploring further the biological component of cognitive failures, two MRI studies reported 
that increased parietal grey matter was predictive of greater distractibility in everyday life 
(Kanai et al., 2011; Sandberg et al., 2014). One of these groups also found that reduced GABA 
in the occipital lobe was associated with increased risk of cognitive failures (Sandberg et al., 
2014). Both findings were thought to be indicative of the role of organic deficits in everyday 
processing efficiency. High neural density may be a sign of inadequate synaptic pruning during 
development (Kanai et al., 2011); low GABA levels may limit the ability to selectively 
suppress sensory information (Sandberg et al., 2014). Together, GABA levels and parietal grey 
matter volume explained about 50% of interindividual variation in failures (Sandberg et al., 
2014). This supports a possible neural basis for the heritability of cognitive failures. 
 
3.2.2 Real world performance 
  The broad purpose of gauging subjective measures of cognition is to gain insight into ‘real 
life’ cognitive functioning, beyond that contrived in the lab or the doctor’s office. Accordingly, 
cognitive failures have been found to correlate with spousal ratings of performance, indicating 
that at least some failures are observable behaviours (Broadbent et al., 1982). They also 
correlate moderately with academic outcomes assessed by the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) 
in the U.S. (Unsworth et al., 2012). Further, positive correlations between the incidence of at-
fault traffic accidents and self-reported cognitive failures  (Larson & Merritt, 1991) illustrate 
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the unique ability of self-report to predict important (indeed, potentially life-or-death) 
performance outcomes in real life.  
Conversely, cognitive failures do not correlate with standard tests of intelligence 
(Broadbent et al., 1982; Larson & Merritt, 1991). Larson & Merritt (1991) proposed that 
cognitive failures are a qualitative feature of attention management style, and as such do not 
tap into the intentional, effortful processes that are engaged in IQ testing. Several researchers 
held the view that the CFQ accesses aspects of cognition distinct to the processes tapped by 
traditional assessment methods.  
 
3.2.3 Relationship with stress  
In one of few studies involving repeated measurement, Broadbent et al.’s (1982) findings 
suggested that predisposition towards cognitive failures increases susceptibility to minor 
mental health symptoms following a period of exposure to stress – in this case, nurses placed 
on more stressful wards. In Broadbent et al.’s (1986) later research, they further posited slips 
reflect a preferred (albeit problematic) processing strategy more likely to be employed by high 
CFQ-scorers in states of high anxiety. That is, when not anxious, high CFQ-scorers may be 
able to perform just as well as their low scoring counterparts. This perhaps suggests that there 
are individual differences (i.e. trait-like factors) which predispose some individuals to 
experiencing cognitive failures when exposed to stress; this would in turn exacerbate the 
negative impacts of stress.  
Contrary to this, a week-long experience sampling study found no link between perceived 
stress levels and number of slips experienced as reported in vivo (Jónsdóttir et al., 2007). Of 
course, perceived stress captures only one component of stress; namely an individual’s 
perception of their control over factors in their life, as well as persistent background stress. It 
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is possible more affective and acute measures of stress will be more closely associated with 
cognitive failures in the flow of everyday life. There are two studies which provide evidence 
to support this conjecture. First, negative mood states exacerbated cognitive failures in daily 
life for those who reported high levels of mind-wandering in the lab (McVay et al., 2009).  
Secondly, cognitive failures of individuals with good control capacity were more likely to be 
increased when faced with distracting environmental factors (e.g. chaos, unpleasant tasks), 
whereas those with poor objective control experienced failures regardless of context (Kane et 
al., 2007). It may be that the CFQ is most useful in examining stress-triggered variations in 
performance, rather than stable neurological deficits (Mahoney, Dalby, & King, 1998).   
 
3.3 What is the relationship of cognitive failures to performance on objective cognitive tasks?  
Several papers selected for this review investigated the relationship between cognitive 
failures and objectively assessed cognitive domains (n = 11; Table 3).  Cognitive domains were 
studied via performance on lab-based tasks, and included attentional networks, behavioural 
inhibition, and working memory and executive control (e.g. Berggren, Hutton, & Derakshan, 
2011; Broadbent et al., 1986; Ishigami & Klein, 2009). Whilst performance outcomes in each 
of these domains were associated with self-reports of cognitive failures (e.g. Berggren et al., 
2011; Ishigami & Klein, 2009; McVay et al., 2009; Tipper & Baylis, 1987), findings were 
inconsistent and no definitive link between failures and a specific objective assessment is yet 
evident.  
 
3.3.1 Attention 
Seven articles focused on the relationship between different aspects of attention and 
everyday slips (Broadbent et al., 1986; Forster & Lavie, 2007; Ishigami & Klein, 2009; Tipper 
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& Baylis, 1987), with mixed findings. An early paper reported that failures did not correlate 
with any measure of attention, however higher CFQ scores were associated with a relative 
performance advantage on a search task compared to a focused attention task (Broadbent et al., 
1986). Subsequent studies generally found that high distractibility on lab tasks was moderately 
correlated with more frequent cognitive failures (Forster & Lavie, 2007; Ishigami & Klein, 
2009; Murphy & Dalton, 2014; Tipper & Baylis, 1987). Individuals with higher cognitive 
failures demonstrated longer reaction times than those with lower scores, in both the presence 
of distractors alongside an absence of negative priming (Tipper & Baylis, 1987), and under 
conditions of low perceptual load (Forster & Lavie, 2007). They were also more susceptible to 
auditory distractors (Murphy & Dalton, 2014). To be distracted is to allow irrelevant 
information to interfere with performance of a current activity (Bergman, O’Brien, Osgood, & 
Cornblatt, 1995); it therefore seems likely that attentional abilities would influence frequency 
of slips in our busy, distraction-laden way of life.  
Of note were two linked experience sampling papers by Unsworth et al. (2012; 2015). 
These compared objective cognition with number of failures reported during everyday life over 
the course of a week. The initial study found that attentional control performance was 
correlated with reports of failures (Unsworth et al., 2012). However, the later extension of the 
analysis identified a relationship between intraindividual variations in attentional control (as 
indicated by shifts in reaction times from trial to trial) and daily slips (Unsworth, 2015). This 
supports the existence of a state-like component of cognitive failures concurrent to its trait-like 
elements, and accentuates the need to consider how best to make use of comparisons between 
existing objective assessments and failures.   
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3.3.2 Inhibition 
The domain of inhibition encapsulates the ability to suppress actions that interfere with 
goal-driven behaviour (Aron, 2007). This objective domain also varied in its relationship with 
cognitive failures. Considering behavioural inhibition first, there were no differences between 
high and low cognitive failure groups on performance of a visual Go/NoGo task (Roche, 
Garavan, Foxe, & O’Mara, 2005). On a physiological level, however, those who report more 
frequent cognitive failures demonstrated increased latency of antisaccade in an eye-movement 
inhibition task, suggestive of both poorer inhibition and greater distractibility (Berggren et al., 
2011). Additionally, when completing a Go/NoGo task, individuals with higher cognitive 
failures demonstrated larger and earlier N2 and P3 components; event-related brain potentials 
thought to reflect activity of the cortical inhibition system (Roche et al., 2005). That is, 
participants with more cognitive failures have to work harder on a cortical level to inhibit their 
behavioural responses under challenging conditions. Taken together, these studies suggest 
while there may be no objective differences in behavioural inhibition in those prone to 
cognitive failures, they may possess a global cortical inefficiency in the physiological 
mechanisms which underpin behavioural and perceptual inhibitory responses.     
 
3.3.3 Working memory and executive control 
Working memory is defined as the ability to concurrently store and manipulate 
information (Baddeley, 2010), whilst executive control organises and maintains actions and 
thoughts according to goals (Kiefer, 2012). Working memory and executive control tasks are 
often grouped together since control of attention and resource allocation is essential in 
supporting working memory (Lara & Wallis, 2014). Like attention and inhibition, working 
memory and executive control are thought to be essential to our ability to process relevant 
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information and stay “on track” to successfully carry out daily activities. Objective working 
memory capacity and lapses in executive control (indicated by task-unrelated thoughts), whilst 
completing laboratory-based tasks, were both found to be associated with cognitive failures 
(Kane et al., 2007; McVay et al., 2009). However, one study found that this association only 
held true for certain levels of cognitive load; participants with high working memory ability 
actually reported more failures when faced with less challenging tasks (Kane et al., 2007). This 
might link to the popularly-held lay view that boredom triggers mind-wandering, thereby 
increasing the chance of mistakes. Overall, correlations between cognitive failures and working 
memory and executive control were not consistently identified. 
 
3.4 What non-cognitive factors influence cognitive failures? 
3.4.1 Personality and functioning 
Thirteen papers looked at the relationship between personality, functioning, and the 
CFQ (Table 4). Higher cognitive failures were found to be related to negative affect (Payne & 
Schnapp, 2014), neuroticism (Wilhelm, Witthöft, & Schipolowski, 2010) and trait anxiety 
(Mahoney et al., 1998), whilst hypomania was associated with lower scores (Rodriguez et al., 
2013). Cognitive failures were proposed to be one of multiple phenomena seen in people with 
these particular personality traits, and self-awareness was considered to be significant in the 
interpretation of these findings. An example hypothesis was that neuroticism may lead to 
increased reporting of cognitive failures since inappropriate worries result in inflated reports 
of problems (the “complaint hypothesis;” Wilhelm et al., 2010) . On the basis of this, it was 
proposed that measures of cognitive failures are contaminated by variability introduced via 
self-awareness deficits (e.g. Chan et al. 2011; Rodriguez et al., 2013;Wilhelm et al., 2010).  
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3.4.1.1 Dissociative experiences 
 Three papers focused specifically on exploration of how tendency towards dissociative 
experiences may relate to cognitive failures. The interest in this particular personality factor 
was based on obvious similarities between sub-clinical dissociative experiences such as 
derealisation (e.g. daydreaming) and mind-wandering aspects of cognitive failures. A strong 
positive correlation between dissociative experiences and cognitive failures was robustly and 
consistently found across all studies (Bruce et al., 2007; Merckelbach, Muris, & Rassin, 1999; 
Wright & Osborne, 2005). Both of these constructs were viewed as aspects of personality 
(Wright & Osborne, 2005) that reflect an underlying vulnerability to lapses in cognitive control 
(Merckelbach et al., 1999) and subsequent difficulties integrating information and processes as 
usual (Bruce et al., 2007; Wright & Osborne, 2005). A related finding was that individuals who 
experience more involuntary autobiographical memories tend to have higher CFQ scores 
(Kamiya, 2014). Whilst the constructs are distinct, these types of involuntary memories may 
be linked to the more disruptive intrusive memories experienced in post-traumatic stress 
disorder. The intrusions in Kamiya’s study were recorded whilst participants were walking 
without attending to anything in particular; it may be that those prone to mind-wandering 
experience fluctuations in cognitive failures in response to situations of reduced attentional 
demand.  
 
3.4.1.2 Schizotypy 
 Five articles examined the association between cognitive failures and schizotypy, a 
normally distributed personality structure reflecting hypothetical risk for psychosis (Van Os & 
Kapur, 2009). Whilst some “high schizotypes” may develop a psychotic disorder, the majority 
will not (Kaymaz, et al., 2012). As such, schizotypy has been included in this review as a 
17 
 
dimension of healthy personality similar to the others included here which all have links 
through to some clinical end point. All authors found a positive correlation between schizotypy 
and cognitive failures, and it was suggested that subjectively-reported cognitive complaints 
may represent an endophenotype of risk for schizophrenia (Corcoran, Devan, Durrant, & 
Liddle, 2012; Laws, Patel, & Tyson, 2008). Further, Pfeifer et al.’s (2009) longitudinal study 
identified higher cognitive failures as a predictor of later negative schizotypal symptoms (e.g. 
introversion, social anhedonia). Cognitive failures may: a) contribute to the development and 
maintenance of schizotypal symptoms; or b) coexist with other symptoms, with the two 
underpinned by related neurological mechanisms. 
The debate over the impact of self-awareness on self-reporting was revisited in 
exploring cognitive failures as a core biomarker of schizotypy. Both Chan et al. (2011) and 
Laws et al. (2008) found robust correlations between schizotypy and cognitive slips in the 
absence of objective deficits. These two papers assessed cognitive slippage, which is similar to 
cognitive failures in that it asks about distractibility and maintenance of goal-directed thinking, 
but also includes some items identifying distortion of thought more specific to schizotypy (e.g. 
‘My thoughts are more random than orderly’). One group concluded that self-awareness 
problems precede other forms of cognitive impairment in psychosis (Chan et al., 2011); the 
other proposed awareness remains intact prior to illness onset, enabling high schizotypes to 
monitor subtle problems that go undetected by objective assessments (Laws et al., 2008).   
Cognitive failures and schizotypy both have demonstrated heritability (e.g. Boomsma, 
1998; Myin-Germeys, Krabbendam, & van Os, 2003). Despite the overlap between the two, 
there does not seem to be a shared genetic basis. Schizotypy in one family member was not 
predictive of cognitive failures in another, lending further support to the idea that cognitive 
failures rely on both inherited traits and individual environmental factors (Pfeifer et al., 2009).
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3.4.2 Biological 
 A portion of articles sought to study biological factors associated with cognitive failures 
in healthy individuals (n = 13; Table 5). Most of these explored circadian rhythm or the healthy 
ageing process. One article examined cognitive failures in pregnancy (Cuttler, Graf, Pawluski, 
& Galea, 2011). The authors found that whilst laboratory assessments failed to identify any 
deficits in pregnant versus non-pregnant women, some of their objective ‘field’ tasks (e.g. 
remembering to call the researchers on a specific day) demonstrated impairments, as did 
women’s own self-reports of cognitive failures. The influence of depression and physical 
symptoms such as fatigue on subjectively-reported but not objective cognition was also noted, 
further highlighting the significance of ecologically valid measures in understanding 
experience  
 
3.4.2.1 Sleep-wake cycle     
 Three articles explored the influence of sleep and the circadian cycle on everyday 
cognition. Severity of insomnia was reported to be associated with daytime cognitive failures, 
independent of mood and stress levels (Wilkerson, Boals, & Taylor, 2011). Levels of 
wakefulness were also considered as an aspect of personality. Wallace et al. (2003) noted that 
individuals prone to boredom typically experience daytime sleepiness and distractibility, thus, 
high levels of cognitive failures are likely a natural consequence of their personality. Another 
study examined individual preferences for morning versus evening hours: individuals known 
respectively as ‘larks’ and ‘owls’ (Mecacci, Righi, & Rocchetti, 2004). Larks reported variable 
levels of cognitive failures with a peak in problems in the evening hours, whilst owls 
experienced their cognitive failures as stable throughout the day. This provides support for the 
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existence of individual circadian differences that interact with time of day to influence 
cognition.       
 
3.4.2.2 Age 
 Eight articles examined the relationship between cognitive failures and normal ageing. 
Whilst the CFQ has been used primarily to study young adults, it demonstrates no age-related 
measurement bias (Rast et al., 2009). Age-related cognitive decline is widely acknowledged as 
a relatively common phenomenon (Hanninen et al., 1996), but a longitudinal study found that 
higher failures predicted a steeper-than-usual trajectory of decline in verbal memory function 
in particular (Hohman et al., 2011). Despite this, there were few differences between the overall 
number of everyday failures reported by older and younger people (Kramer, Humphrey, Larish, 
Logan, & Strayer, 1994; Lange & Süß, 2014; Reese & Cherry, 2006), and one study found that 
older people actually reported fewer slips (Mecacci & Righi, 2006).  
However, when Rast et al. (2009) analysed CFQ scores using a three-factor model of 
the measure, they found that people tend to become more forgetful but less distractible with 
age. They noted a sharp decrease in distractibility occurs in those in their sixties, and proposed 
this may be due to the substantial reduction in attentional demands that comes with retirement-
related lifestyle changes. On the other hand, some authors held that objective performance 
deficits and poor ratings by informants prove that older people do make more errors in daily 
life, but are incompetent in monitoring and reporting these (Harty, O’Connell, Hester, & 
Robertson, 2013; Mecacci & Righi, 2006).  In contradiction, an experience sampling study 
found a moderate correlation between older people’s CFQ scores and in vivo reports of slips 
(Lange & Süß, 2014). This perhaps again highlights potential limitations of the use of objective 
assessments as a comparison point for perceptions of day-to-day failures. In addition, there 
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may be factors specific to older people to consider. For example, the advantage of life 
experience: older people can and do actively compensate for their absent-mindedness by 
adjusting the cues they use – both internal and external – for memory and attention (Maylor, 
1990).  
 
4. Discussion 
 In this systematic review, we identified and summarised existing studies of cognitive 
failures in healthy populations. The topics explored using the CFQ and other subjective 
measures varied widely. This paper focused on reviewing cognitive failures in healthy 
population samples, with the aim of identifying key features of cognitive failures and their 
relationship to objective cognition. We also aimed to develop a model of factors that influence 
liability towards cognitive failures in otherwise healthy individuals.  
 
4.1 Limitations 
There are several possible limitations of this review. First, appraisal of studies was 
difficult due to poor definition clarity for cognitive failures across articles. In addition, the fact 
that this area of research is still somewhat exploratory (with the bulk of articles describing 
correlational data) meant that systematic critique of study quality as per the PRISMA statement 
was not feasible. Perhaps as this field matures more studies using randomised controlled trials 
and papers meeting the higher quality of PRISMA criteria will eventuate. The majority of 
studies used the CFQ however measures differed across studies. For instance, one study used 
qualitative analysis (Jónsdóttir et al., 2007) but focused on the frequency of errors reported, 
and so was included here. Despite these limitations to our ability to present a systematic review 
which strictly adheres to the tight recommendations of PRISMA, the articles included have 
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allowed us to begin to develop a more comprehensive model of cognitive failures, as per the 
overarching aim of this review. 
There did not appear to be a significant publication bias, with articles reporting positive 
and negative results. Time and access limitations meant that it is likely that not all relevant 
articles published pre-1990 were accessed; thus, information stemming from earlier trends in 
the approach to cognitive failures may be limited. However, we are confident that all key papers 
from this period were included, and as such our picture of the changing understanding of 
cognitive failures is adequate. 
 
4.2 Features of the construct of cognitive failures 
Problems with memory and action slips are identified as core dimensions measured by 
cognitive failures (Broadbent et al., 1982; Pollina et al., 1992; Wallace et al., 2002). However, 
this tight definition may exclude some aspects of everyday failures such as more general 
cognitive functioning, distractibility, and mind-wandering. On the basis of the studies gathered 
here, we suggest a broader definition: cognitive failures reflect errors in real world planned 
thought and action, proneness to which is determined by internal and external exacerbating 
factors. 
Although the mode of inheritance has not been explored as yet, heritability could be 
conferred: 1) directly through dominant, recessive, or more likely a number of genes conferring 
a small effect; 2) indirectly through a general inefficiency of information processing; or 3) 
indirectly through familial risk for personality variables, which in themselves increase the 
likelihood of failures occurring. Related to this is the finding that women are more at-risk for 
slips than men (Boomsma, 1998; Kanai et al., 2011). Again, this may stem from a number of 
sources including a direct biological basis, or indirectly via personality traits that occur at more 
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elevated levels and/or more frequently in women and are also associated with cognitive 
failures. For example, women score higher on neuroticism than men (Costa, Terracciano, & 
McCrae, 2001; Wilhelm et al., 2010), which may render them more alert to and aware of their 
own errors. Regardless of the mechanism, the heritability and gender differences of cognitive 
failures points towards a set of behaviours which are stable and trait-like. 
 The final core feature of cognitive failures is one that tends to be implied only; they 
encompass errors that occur in a particular context: “real life.” This assumption needs to be 
made explicit given that most cognitive research examines cognition that is not occurring in 
ecological contexts. The necessarily subjective approach of cognitive failures highlights that 
the personal, real-time experience of cognition in an everyday context is both measureable and 
meaningful, despite being a clear departure from traditional cognition research. 
 
4.3 Cognitive failures versus objective performance 
The correlations between self-reported cognitive failures and performance on domain-
specific neuropsychological tasks are small at best (e.g. Ishigami & Klein, 2009; Wallace et 
al., 2002). While the search for such a relationship has been the focus of much recent research 
into cognitive failures, it is interesting to note that multiple studies have compared selective 
attention with everyday failures, whilst few have explored other cognitive ability domains. 
Certainly, an attentional deficit would seem to be the most obvious neuropsychological concern 
– mind-wandering could serve as the catalyst for many of the most common types of failures. 
However, further research into other subtypes of attention, working memory, and inhibition is 
perhaps warranted, given the potential significance of each of these in managing multiple and 
complex demands in daily life. Ignoring these gaps, if we take the criterion for validity of self-
reported cognition to be correspondence with objective neuropsychological performance, the 
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CFQ clearly falls short. However, as stated above, we may not be looking at corresponding 
constructs in objective neuropsychological performance and subjectively-reported cognitive 
failures.  
Roughly half of the articles reviewed here attribute the gap between objective and 
subjectively-reported cognition to impairments in the ability to self-monitor (e.g. Chan et al., 
2011; Rodriguez et al., 2013; Wilhelm et al., 2010). For example, neuroticism (Wilhelm et al., 
2010), stress, and anxiety (Mahoney et al., 1998) are all related to cognitive failures, but may 
also induce biased styles of responding to questions regarding personal performance.  Whilst 
this explanation is popular in the literature, the theoretical basis is not yet well established. 
Different authors view CFQ scores that are not predicted by neuropsychological outcomes as 
indicators of exaggerated (Wilhelm et al., 2010) or alternatively under-developed (Chan et al., 
2011; Rodriguez et al., 2013) self-awareness (or insight). The inconsistency in these 
interpretations may stem from authors adjusting them according to the direction of their 
expected results compared to those obtained. Recent research utilising experience sampling 
found that neurotic individuals reported increased failures in vivo, presumably in the absence 
of biases expected in retrospective self-reports (Lange & Süß, 2014). The debate around the 
role of self-awareness in cognitive failures is ongoing. 
Despite the lack of correlation with neuropsychological outcomes, cognitive failures 
relate closely to a range of real life outcomes. These include likelihood of being the at-fault 
driver in a car accident (Larson & Merritt, 1991), university entrance scores (Unsworth et al., 
2012), and behavioural observations from spouses (Broadbent et al., 1982). These findings 
further support the idea that objective and subjective assessments of cognition could represent 
two different but equally valuable concepts for measurement. The best way to conceptualise 
this difference is not yet clear. However, a quick glance at the nature of how we go about 
traditional neuropsychological testing (at one time point; in one isolated, idealistic test setting) 
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would suggest that its correspondence to real world functioning would be poor. In real world 
cognition multiple factors interlink, combine, and interact, in ways still yet to be investigated, 
to shape our capacity according to levels of stress, the people around us, or even whether it is 
9am or 5.30pm. Again, this gap in our knowledge likely stems from the long-standing focus 
on ability in human cognition, which has been to the detriment of our understanding of how 
ability is implemented in the more chaotic setting of daily life.  
 
4.4 Factors contributing to cognitive failures 
 Given that the experience of cognitive failures seems to be distinct from 
neuropsychological ability, research in this area has gradually turned towards exploring the 
influence of other aspects of the individual and their daily context. Whilst the definition that 
arises from the existing literature highlights a possible primary basis in biology (i.e. genetics 
and sex), a range of secondary factors are also evident. We have grouped these into stable 
factors and variable factors (see Figure 2). 
 
4.4.1 Stable factors 
A number of factors that are considered trait-like are associated with increased 
frequency of cognitive failures (see the blue/inner circles of the model, Figure 2). The strong 
link with dissociative experiences (Bruce et al., 2007; Merckelbach et al., 1999; Wright & 
Osborne, 2005) is not surprising; lapses in control that trigger mild dissociation are similar to 
those resulting in unexpected errors in routine tasks. Schizotypy is also related to more frequent 
cognitive failures (Giesbrecht et al., 2007; Laws et al., 2008; Pfeifer et al., 2009); this may be 
through similar mechanisms as there is a documented relationship between schizotypy and 
dissociation (Barkus, Stirling, & Cavill, 2010). Schizotypy represents the subclinical end of a 
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spectrum of psychosis-proneness, and failures may represent a subclinical level of the cognitive 
deficits often seen in schizophrenia. The possible mechanism by which neuroticism (Wilhelm 
et al., 2010) and trait anxiety (Mahoney et al., 1998) increase the likelihood of cognitive failures 
in daily life has been discussed earlier, and is less clear. Whilst failures in both schizotypy and 
dissociation are viewed as reflecting core deficits in cognitive control, neuroticism and anxiety 
tend to be perceived by researchers as linked to problems of self-awareness.  
Alternatively, it is possible that failures represent patterns of cognition that are 
characteristic of particular personality types. Another possibility is that cognitive failures may 
contribute to (or even play a causal role in) personality. Taking schizotypy as an example, 
consistently high rates of cognitive failures could reduce success of social functioning, which 
is another feature of this personality structure (Miller & Lenzenweger, 2012). We could also 
interpret personality traits such as anxiety, neuroticism, and schizotypy as more broadly 
reflecting difficulties in emotional regulation, which determines ultimate sensitivity of 
cognitive capacity to external stressors. Using another example from schizotypy, an additional 
load such as stress is needed to trigger problems in objective performance in high schizotypes 
(Smith & Lenzenweger, 2010), and this would likely be reflected in everyday failures. This 
remains speculation however, due to the limited research on the relationship between cognitive 
failures and personality. Nevertheless, the link with several personality traits is strong, and 
provides further evidence that there is stability in tendency towards failures. 
 
4.4.2 Variable factors 
Equally as influential in cognitive failures are state-based, variable factors (see the 
red/outer circles of the model, Figure 2). Those that have been identified in the current review 
vary widely, and experience would suggest it is likely that many more have yet to be studied.  
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 Most people would agree that their ability to concentrate appears to be reduced in times 
of high stress, or when they feel fatigued or have low mood. Accordingly, day-to-day cognitive 
failures seem to increase reliably in response to poor sleep quality and low mood (Payne & 
Schnapp, 2014; Wilkerson et al., 2011), as well as high anxiety (Mahoney et al., 1998; Mecacci 
et al., 2004). Also unsurprisingly, the environment and current activity influence failures as 
well. Challenging tasks or chaotic surrounds can trigger slips (Kane et al., 2007) but so can 
finding oneself feeling bored (Wallace et al., 2003). Although no studies exist as yet, we could 
also suspect contextual features such as social setting (and individual expectations associated 
with this) and task saliency would also impact the flow of cognition. 
 Hormonal state and age are biological factors which, whilst more stable than emotional 
or environmental states, also constantly change over time. Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
hormonal changes can significantly impact on normal cognition. This has been particularly 
evident in women, with the whole gamut of phases including pre-menstrual states, 
menstruation, pregnancy and ‘baby brain,’ and menopause interfering with normal cognition 
in women (e.g. Cuttler et al., 2011; Henry & Rendell, 2007; Keogh, Cavill, Moore, & 
Eccleston, 2014; Sherwin, 2013). This could be another reason women tend to report more 
failures: they are regularly exposed to physiological processes that may interrupt functioning 
either directly, or indirectly through symptoms such as fatigue and lowered mood. However, 
research examining subjectively-reported failures across the menstrual cycle is yet to be 
conducted. 
Surprisingly, given popular views of ageing, the current review did not provide strong 
evidence for an age-related increase in cognitive failures. Older people tended not to complain 
of more problems than younger people (Kramer et al., 1994; Reese & Cherry, 2006) although 
some researchers did identify problems with specific areas such as memory, but not attention 
(Rast et al., 2009). Linking back to the self-awareness debate, it is possible that, as some 
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researchers have suggested, older people are inaccurate in their reporting (Harty et al., 2013). 
However, it is also possible that older adults hold an advantage in terms of awareness of 
problems and experience in using compensatory strategies, resulting in the relative parity of 
young and old CFQ scores (Maylor, 1990). Some researchers have suggested that the lack of 
an increase in failures with age may be more closely associated with environment (Rast et al., 
2009); that is, that the less demanding lifestyle of retirement limits opportunity for mistakes. 
This conclusion is debateable, as by definition, failures are unexpected errors in the normal 
flow of daily life, and their occurrence is not dependent on particular types of lifestyle or 
activities. Overall, the current findings suggest that heightened cognitive failures are not 
necessarily part of healthy ageing. Further research should seek to determine their utility as an 
early indicator of where dementia or psychological difficulties may be evolving, particularly 
given that this can be easily captured with a brief questionnaire. 
 The final factor identified in this review is time of day. Not only does lack of sleep 
impact functioning during the day (Wilkerson et al., 2011), but personal preference for the 
morning or evening hours also shapes the pattern of failures that will occur over the course of 
the 24-hour circadian cycle (Mecacci et al., 2004). We have placed time in the outer circle of 
our model of cognitive failures as it is the one factor that will always be exerting influence, no 
matter what else is in play. Time may seem a superfluous inclusion, however, traditional 
assessment of cognition generally ignores it and the current findings suggest it is vital to 
explaining the fluctuations in functioning that we all experience throughout every day. The 
study of the stress-related hormone cortisol is an example of research that has acknowledged 
the significance of time of day. There is recognition of a diurnal pattern of cortisol secretion, 
which is biologically pre-programmed but also responsive to behavioural and environmental 
stressors (Dmitrieva, Almeida, Dmitrieva, Loken, & Pieper, 2013). As such, the preferred 
methodology includes sampling cortisol levels at multiple time points over multiple days. 
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Given the link between stress and cognitive failures, this approach to measurement is likely 
also of value to cognitive research. 
4.4.3 Co-occurrence and interaction of contributing factors 
Notably absent from our proposed model is underlying cognitive ability. Even very 
broad measures such as IQ are unable to predict which individuals will experience more or less 
cognitive failures (Larson & Merritt, 1991). Whilst this is potentially due to the different goals 
of objective and self-report approaches to cognitive research, the model we suggest here could 
provide for another explanation: ability may interact with context in which cognition is 
occurring. This fits with the findings of Kane et al. (2007) that those with low ability experience 
failures quite consistently, whilst those higher in ability tend to experience slippage only when 
faced with distracting environments. Despite the ongoing search for a link to 
neuropsychological performance, we consider that at this stage there is insufficient evidence 
for us to include cognitive ability in the model. However, the possible interaction of other stable 
factors with shifts in state is highlighted.  
As yet, very few studies have examined whether co-occurrence of factors may have an 
additive or otherwise impact on the likelihood of experiencing failures. The model proposed 
here highlights that whilst the various aspects of biology, personality, mood, and environment 
affecting cognitive failures are distinct, within an individual any combination of these could 
exert influence at the same time. Visually, the model depicted in Figure 1 as applied to one 
person would feature the outer circles constantly shifting around the stable inner ones 
throughout each moment of the day. The alignment of factors at any given point in time would 
determine how effectively that person will perform. This interplay is an unavoidable part of 
human life, but one which is routinely overlooked.    
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Consideration of the effects of co-occurring factors may also help solve the debate on 
the problem of self-awareness and bias in reporting. For example, those personalities that have 
been linked to greater cognitive failures without necessarily exhibiting deficits of ability, such 
as schizotypal, anxious, or neurotic types, are known to be more reactive to both interpersonal 
and environmental stress (Collip et al., 2013; Gunthert, Cohen, & Armeli, 1999). It may be that 
such individuals experience problems whilst dealing with the time-pressures and hassles of 
daily responsibilities, but not when asked to perform in the relative calm of the laboratory. In 
one similar interaction already elucidated, people with a preference for morning hours (i.e. 
‘morning larks’ in circadian typology) are more likely to experience failures in the evening 
hours (Mecacci et al., 2004). As such, rather than having poor self-awareness, it may be that 
the occurrence of failures reflects a diathesis-stress-like process.  
 
4.5 Conclusions and directions for cognitive failures research 
Cognitive researchers have never been quite comfortable with the idea of measuring 
cognition using anything other than a relatively narrow range of objective assessment 
paradigms. The subjective way in which measures such as the CFQ gauge problems in 
everyday functioning is perceived as especially questionable. However, the findings of this 
review highlight that whilst self-reported failures do not appear to directly reflect any specific 
domain of ability, they are reliably influenced by a range of other factors. Some of these 
contributing factors are trait-like and have potential to shape a person’s functioning from birth, 
whilst many are dependent on momentary shifts in surroundings and time of day. Therefore, 
concerns about the validity of treating cognitive failures as a measure of cognitive ability are 
founded. Instead, we propose that the construct of cognitive failures actually provides a 
measure of cognitive capacity. Capacity is understood here as one’s level of cognitive 
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performance in a particular situation. It is perceived to be fluid; shifting over time and with 
context. This is distinct from cognitive ability, which is understood as the relatively stable level 
at which a person may optimally function, given ideal circumstances. Ability is biologically 
determined (by genetics, age, and disease status), whilst capacity is shaped on a momentary 
basis and reflects the fluctuations that are observed in performance during real life.  
Much of the research into cognitive failures thus far has been disparate in terms of both 
the construct’s conceptualisation and the contributing factors of interest. In addition, no studies 
thus far have considered the interaction between factors. Our model of cognitive failures as a 
gauge of cognitive capacity, whilst preliminary, could provide a unitary basis for future 
research. We suggest the following key goals for further study: 
1) Elucidate the effects of co-occurring key trait and state factors in cognitive failures, such 
as trait anxiety and stress. 
2) Explore the relationship between cognitive failures and psychological disorders. 
3) In the long-term, determine whether a brief self-report tool such as the CFQ, which could 
be easily administered by a primary-care clinician, holds potential as an early diagnostic 
indicator for diseases such as dementia and schizophrenia. 
4) Also in the long-term, determine whether everyday cognitive failures may serve as a target 
for early intervention in diseases such as dementia and schizophrenia.   
Whilst the ‘what’ for future research is relatively clear, the ‘how’ is less so. The existing 
research makes clear that the full range of fluctuating factors relevant to day-to-day cognitive 
experiences simply cannot be measured in the lab. The recent emergence of experience 
sampling methods offers a means of evaluating many of these factors in more ecologically 
valid ways. If for no other reason, this form of ambulatory assessment is necessary to capture 
the time of day effects that invariably influence us all. This method requires a great deal of 
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refinement in its application to cognitive failures, however it may be the next step in the 
emerging shift in cognitive research from the laboratory to real life. Whatever the method 
future researchers choose, they will be contributing to an emerging strong field which holds 
the potential to understand the working of our minds at their most important: during our 
everyday lives. 
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Figure captions 
Figure 1. Flow diagram of study selection for systematic review of published research on 
cognitive failures in healthy populations. 
Figure 2. Factors associated with increased risk of cognitive failures.  
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Table 1. Self-report Measures of Cognitive Failures in Articles Selected for Review 
Measure  Domains of error 
assessed 
Structure of measure Sample item 
Cognitive Failures 
Questionnaire 
(CFQ; Broadbent 
et al., 1982) 
Self and informant 
versions available. 
- Perception 
- Memory 
- Misdirected action 
25 items describing 
common slips of 
thought and behaviour. 
Frequency rated along 
5-point scale from Very 
Often to Never.  
Do you fail to listen 
to people’s names 
when you are 
meeting them? 
Cognitive Slippage 
Scale (CSS; Miers 
& Raulin, 1987) 
- Confused thinking 
- Speech deficits 
35 items designed to 
measure cognitive slips 
and distortion. Requires 
a True/False response. 
I often find myself 
saying something 
that comes out 
completely 
backwards. 
Dysexecutive 
Syndrome 
Questionnaire 
(DEX; Burgess, 
Alderman, Wilson, 
Evans, & Emslie, 
1996) 
- Inhibition 
- Intentionality 
- Executive memory 
20 items describing 
behaviours arising from 
problems with 
executive control. 
Frequency rated along 
5-point scale from Very 
Often to Never. 
I get events mixed 
up, or get confused 
about the correct 
order of events. 
Prospective and 
Retrospective 
Memory 
Questionnaire 
(PRMQ; Smith, 
Della Sala, Logie, 
& Maylor, 2000) 
- Memory 16 items describing 
particular types of 
memory errors. 
Frequency rated along 
5-point scale from Very 
Often to Never.  
Do you decide to do 
something in a few 
minutes’ time and 
then forget to do it? 
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Table 2  
Notes: 1 = CFQ self-report; 2 = CFQ informant-rated, 3 = self-reports captured using experience sampling in vivo. 
 
Reference Study sample and population Findings 
Broadbent et al. (1982) 1,2  910 participants across groups 
drawn from various healthy 
populations. 
CFQ correlations with existing measures suggest three aspects of cognitive failures being measured: memory, 
perception, and action. Weak correlations with social desirability and neuroticism scales; no correlation with 
intelligence. 
Larson & Merritt (1991)1 159 healthy adult male Navy 
recruits. 
CFQ scores were positively correlated with the number of times young men had been cited for causing a 
significant traffic accident. Intelligence was not related to accidents or CFQ scores. 
Pollina, Greene, Tunick, 
& Pucket (1992) 1 
419 healthy students. Principal components analysis identified 5 internally-consistent factors: Distractibility, Misdirected Actions, 
Spatial/Kinaesthetic Memory, Interpersonal Intelligence, and Memory for Names.  
Boomsma (1998) 1 1651 healthy twin pairs and 
parents recruited from the 
community (the Netherlands). 
Found the heritability of CFQ scores to be about 50%, with females reporting higher mean CFQ scores in 
both parent and child generations. There was no association between CFQ scores and education level or age. 
Wallace, Kass, & Stanny 
(2002) 1 
335 healthy students and Navy 
personnel. 
Analysis yielded 4 internally-consistent factors of the CFQ: Memory, Distractibility, Blunders, and (memory 
for) Names. 
Jónsdóttir, Adólfsdóttir, 
Cortez, Gunnarsdóttir, & 
Gústafsdóttir (2007) 3 
189 healthy volunteers. No correlation between perceived stress and number of slips reported over a week in a diary. A weak 
correlation with pre-diary estimate of functioning was present. 
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Kanai, Dong, Bahrami, & 
Rees (2011) 1 
145 healthy volunteers. Greater density of grey matter in the left superior parietal lobe predicted CFQ scores; as did performance on 
an attentional capture task in the lab.  
Markett, Montag, 
Diekmann, & Reuter 
(2014)1 
500 healthy adults. Carriers of C/C genotype of the dopamine receptor D2 were less susceptible to failures, with the genotype 
explaining about 1.9% of heritability in CFQ scores. The link was partially mediated by trait impulsivity.   
Sandberg et al. (2014) 1 36 healthy adult males. Increased GABA in the occipital lobe was correlated with decreased CFQ scores, and density of grey matter 
in the left superior parietal lobe also predicted CFQ scores. Together, variations in occipital GABA and LSPL 
accounted for 50% of intra-individual variation in failures. 
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Table 3. Objective Cognitive Domains And Their Relationship with Cognitive Failures 
Reference Cognitive domains studied: 
Selective attention Alerting attention 
 
Working memory/ 
Executive function
Inhibition of behaviour
Broadbent, Broadbent, & Jones (Broadbent et al., 1986) 1 X X                 - - 
Tipper & Baylis (1987) 1 √ - -  - 
Roche, Garavan, Foxe, & O’Mara (2005) 1 - - - X 
Kane et al. (Kane et al., 2007) 3 - - X * - 
Forster & Lavie (2007) 1 X * - - - 
Ishigami & Klein (2009) 1 √ √ X - 
McVay et al. (2009) 3 - - √ - 
Berggren, Hutton, & Derakshan (2011) 1 √ - - √ 
Unsworth, Brewer, & Spillers (2012) 3 √ - X - 
Murphy & Dalton (2014)1 √ - - - 
Unsworth (2015) 3 √ - √ - 
Notes: 1 = CFQ self-report; 3 = self-reports of everyday failures captured in vivo via experience sampling. √ = Significant association, X = no 
significant association, - = not examined in the study,* = relationship was mediated by cognitive demands of the task at hand (i.e. relationship 
exists only at specific levels of demand).  
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Table 4 
Reference Study sample and population Findings 
Personality and functioning 
Mahoney, Dalby, & King 
(1998) 1,2 
138 healthy adults. CFQ scores were positively correlated with measures of stress and both trait and state anxiety. CFQ scores of self and others’ reports 
correlated.  
Wilhelm, Witthöft, & 
Schipolowski  (2010) 1 
3,122 healthy participants; 
characteristics unspecified. 
Interpretation of combined results of 5 studies indicates that probability of reporting subjective impairment is increased by high 
neuroticism.  
Rodriguez et al. (2013) 1 128 healthy undergraduate 
students. 
Individuals at high risk for bipolar appraised themselves as more high-functioning than did low-risk individuals. There were no objective 
differences, and no relationship between CFQ and working memory scores. 
Kamiya (Kamiya, 2014) 1 24 healthy undergraduate 
students. 
The number of autobiographical memories experienced by individuals on a 20 minute walk was moderately positively correlated with 
CFQ score.  
Payne & Schnapp (2014) 1 129 healthy undergraduate 
students. 
Negative affective states were moderately correlated with overall CFQ scores, whilst positive affect was not.  
Dissociative experiences 
Merckelbach, Muris, & 
Rassin (1999) 1 
128 healthy undergraduate 
students. 
Significant positive correlations exist between dissociative experiences and reports of cognitive failures. Cognitive failures were not 
related to fantasy proneness. 
Wright & Osborne (2005) 1 80 healthy undergraduate 
students. 
Strong positive correlation between dissociative experiences and cognitive failures. Cognitive failures were not related to performance 
on working memory tasks involving secondary interference. 
Bruce et al. (2007) 1 1040 healthy undergraduate 
students. 
Significant correlations between cognitive failures and measures of dissociative experiences. 
Schizotypy 
Giesbrecht, Merckelbach, 
Kater, & Sluis (2007) 1 
185 healthy undergraduate 
students. 
Two cognitive processes of cognitive failures and fantasy-proneness account for 58% of the link between dissociation and schizotypy.  
Laws, Patel, & Tyson   (2008) 
5 
65 healthy participants. There were no differences between high and low schizotypes on a battery of executive function tasks. However, high schizotypes did 
report a greater frequency of everyday executive problems. 
Pfeifer, van Os, Hanssen, 
Delespaul, & Krabbendam 
(2009) 1 
566 genetically related pairs 
from the community. 
Proneness to cognitive failures was associated with negative/depressive dimensions of schizotypy. Cognitive failures and schizotypy did 
not share a genetic basis. 
Chan et al. (2011) 5 93 healthy students and 
community members. 
There were no differences between high and low schizotypes on a battery of executive function tasks. However, high schizotypes did 
report a greater frequency of everyday executive problems. Low schizotypes’ subjective reports were related to some objective outcomes. 
Corcoran, Devan, Durrant & 
Liddle (Corcoran et al., 2013) 
1,5 
269 healthy students. Found a strong positive correlation between schizotypy and CFQ and DEX scores.  
Notes: 1 = CFQ self-report; 2 = CFQ informant-rated; 5 = DEX 
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Table 5 
Reference Study sample and population Findings 
Cuttler, Graf, Pawluski, & 
Galea (2011) 1,4 
61 pregnant women. Found subjective impairment but no evidence of objective deficits in pregnant women. Depressed mood and physical 
symptoms were associated with greater subjective problems. 
Sleep-wake cycles 
Wallace, Vodanovich, & 
Restino (2003) 1 
126 healthy US military personnel 
and 137 undergraduate students. 
Higher daytime sleepiness and proneness to boredom was predictive of everyday failures, and military personnel 
reported more sleepiness and failures than students. 
Mecacci, Righi, & 
Rocchetti (Mecacci et al., 
2004) 1 
390 healthy undergraduate students. Frequency of reported cognitive slips was increased with neuroticism, anxiety, and extreme morningness (vs. 
eveningness in circadian typology). Morning types were more susceptible to errors in the evening, whereas evening 
types were more uniform in their slippage throughout the day. 
Wilkerson, Boals & Taylor 
(2011) 1 
941 healthy undergraduate students. Found a positive relationship between severity of insomnia and cognitive failures, even after controlling for confounds 
of depression, stress and anxiety. 
Age 
Maylor (1990) 1 320 female adults between the ages 
of 52-95. 
Regardless of intelligence, individuals with higher CFQ scores were more likely to forget to call researchers in a memory 
task (i.e. had worse prospective memory). There was no relationship between retrospective and prospective memory 
performance. 
Kramer, Humphrey, Larish, 
Logan, & Strayer (1994) 1 
30 elderly adults. No differences between older and younger adults in self-reported failures, but older adults demonstrated slight objective 
impairment in some aspects of inhibition. CFQ correlated with several outcomes of objective inhibitory tasks. 
Mecacci & Righi (2006)1 1826 healthy adults aged 16 -85 
years. 
Older people reported fewer cognitive failures than younger people, and their metacognition (attitudes/worry about 
cognition, cognitive confidence, etc.) did not seem reduced. However, across age groups, metacognitive worries were 
associated with increased failures.  
Reese & Cherry (2006) 1,6 96 healthy adults recruited from the 
community. 
Overall CFQ did not differ between older or younger adults, or between those with high or low verbal ability. CFQ 
scores were not related to objective performance. 
Rast, Zimprich, Van 
Boxtel, & Jolles  (2009) 1 
Cross-sectional data from 1303 
healthy adults. 
The CFQ is free of age-related measurement bias. The factor of forgetfulness increases with age, whilst distractibility 
suddenly decreases in the mid-60s.  
Hohman, Beason-Held, 
Lamar, & Resnick (2011) 1 
98 adults with mean age 75 
followed over mean 11.5 years. 
Higher levels of cognitive failures were associated with steeper rates of decline in objective verbal memory performance 
and increased activity in insular, lingual and cerebellar areas during memory processing. 
Harty, O’Connell, Hester, 
& Robertson (2013) 1 
90 healthy adults aged 18 – 90.  Older people tended to underestimate the frequency of their cognitive failures relative to informant reports. Older people 
also demonstrated poorer online awareness of their errors in an objective attentional task. There was no relationship 
between CFQ and objective cognitive performance. 
Lange & Süß (Lange & 
Süß, 2014)1 
91 healthy adults aged 60 – 76 
years.  
The frequency of failures as collected via experience sampling correlated moderately with the CFQ. Neuroticism was 
more closely correlated with ES failures than the CFQ.  There was no correlation between age and CFQ score.  
Notes: 1 = CFQ self-report; 4 = PRMQ; 6 = other quantitative measure of cognitive failures constructed by authors. 
